We can't afford to have every vehicle in the Army look like this." "Software costs are becoming unaffordable. Do you know what's driving that cost?" he asked the audience. The "one on the right is exponentially more expensive at every level of maintenance and repair parts.
The Army hasn't really "taken that on," he said, referring to the associated costs from the unit to the depot levels. Today, "our vehicles have become fighting platforms," he said, just "like Bradleys and tanks." The Humvee on the right was armored and had computerized displays, a gun turret and other gizmos. In 1999, "a company commander might have had a speaker and a radio," he said, referring to add-on components. The one on the left side looked like a chop shop had cleaned out a lot of goodies while the one on the right was jazzed up for the 21st-century battlefield. Mason then showed a PowerPoint slide (see attached), showing a 1999 Humvee on the left, and a 2014 one on the right. "If commanders don't see it, they don't trust the system, so they order more and more ammunition." "Many ammunition lines in Afghanistan had 10 years capability on the ground because the commanders don't trust us," he said, adding that one reason may be skepticism in the IT system. Once again, Mason pointed out the need to find that sweet spot in tradeoffs, citing two examples, the first being "just-in-case" logistics: We did that in Desert Storm and the beginning of OIF," he said. "We don't want the other end of the spectrum, where there's 'just-in-case' logistics, solving everything with mass. Any more than that would likely be excess inventory with associated high overhead costs.īusiness practice for the military, Mason said, would work out to having just enough ammunition to kill the last enemy with the last remaining bullet.
Just in time, for example, is used by retailers who order just enough stock to fill orders or over-the-counter sales. But there are money people and programmers that want to drive this." "The closer you get where people are fighting and dying, business practices don't make sense. Campbell spoke to earlier in the morning - the notion of "just-in-time" business practice used for military applications. He then made reference to what Army Vice Chief of Staff John F. "There are a lot of innovative things can be done to reduce the tail, but just cutting it and taking out capability before putting in a mitigation process and solution set just increases risk." Like many things in life, he said the ratio involves a tradeoff. Army's "Sustaining Force 2025" seminar here, yesterday. He delivered his remarks at the Association of the U.S. Mason, deputy chief of staff, G-4, was referring to a "tooth-to-tail" ratio with the tail being logistics supporting the infantry.
(Army News Service, May 21, 2014) - "I truly understand we want the pointy end of the spear and a lot of trigger pullers… But just saying 'reduce the tail, reduce the tail'" is a risky proposition. Mason, deputy chief of staff, G-4, said at the beginning of World War II, the Army did some out-of-the-box thinkin.ĪRLINGTON, Va. One of the Doolittle B-25 aircraft takes off from the deck of the USS Hornet in April 1942, to bomb mainland Japan. Army) VIEW ORIGINAL 5 / 5 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Mason, deputy chief of staff, G-4, to the air resupply mission for Afghanistan following the closur. The Red Ball Express supply route during World War II from Normandy to the front lines is depicted here, and favorably compared by Lt. Army) VIEW ORIGINAL 4 / 5 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Army) VIEW ORIGINAL 3 / 5 Show Caption + Hide Caption – (Photo Credit: U.S. Army) VIEW ORIGINAL 2 / 5 Show Caption + Hide Caption – (Photo Credit: U.S. 1 / 5 Show Caption + Hide Caption – (Photo Credit: U.S.
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